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Abstract
Technologies that use the Internet network to deliver
voice communications have the potential to reduce costs
and improve access to communications services around the
world. However, these new technologies pose several chal-
lenges in terms of confidentiality of the conversations and
anonymity of the conversing parties. Call authentication
and encryption techniques provide a way to protect con-
fidentiality, while anonymity is typically preserved by an
anonymizing service (anonymous call).
This work studies the feasibility of revealing pairs of
anonymous and encrypted conversing parties (caller/callee
pair of streams) by exploiting the vulnerabilities inherent
to VoIP systems. In particular, by exploiting the aperiodic
inter-departure time of VoIP packets, we can trivialize each
VoIP stream into a binary time-series. We first define a sim-
ple yet intuitive metric to gauge the correlation between two
VoIP binary streams. Then we propose an effective tech-
nique that progressively pairs conversing parties with high
accuracy and in a limited amount of time. Our metric and
method are justified analytically and validated by experi-
ments on a very large standard corpus of conversational
speech. We obtain impressively high pairing accuracy that
reaches 97% after 5 minutes of voice conversations.
1 Introduction
The International Telecommunications industry is in the
early stages of a migration to Voice over Internet Proto-
col (VoIP). VoIP is a technology that enables the routing
of voice conversations over any IP-based networks such as
the public Internet. The voice data flows over a general-
purpose packet-switched network rather than over the tradi-
tional circuit-switched Public Switched Telephone Network
(PSTN). Market research firms including In-Stat and IDC
predict that 2005-2009 will be the consumer and small busi-
ness VoIP ramp-up period, and migration to VoIP will peak
in the 2010-2014 time frame. Research organization Gart-
ner Inc. recently reported that spending by U.S. companies
and public-sector organizations on VoIP systems is on track
to grow to $903 million in 2005 (up from the $686 million
in 2004). Gartner expects that by 2007, 97% of new phone
systems installed in North America to be VoIP or hybrids.
While the migration to VoIP seems inevitable, there are
security risks associated with this technology that are care-
fully being addressed. Eavesdropping is one of the most
common threats in a VoIP environment. Unauthorized in-
terception of audio streams and decoding of signaling mes-
sages can enable the eavesdropper to tap audio streams
in an unsecured VoIP environment. Call authentication
and encryption mechanisms [2, 15] are being deployed to
preserve customers’ confidentiality. Preserving customers’
anonymity is also crucial, which encompasses both the
identity of the people involved in a conversation and the re-
lationship caller/callee (pair of voice streams). Anonymiz-
ing overlay networks such as Onion Routing [7] and Find-
Not.com [16] aim at providing an answer to this problem
by concealing the IP addresses of the conversing parties. A
recent work [14] shows that tracking anonymous peer-to-
peer VoIP calls on the Internet is actually feasible. The key
idea consists in embedding a unique watermark into the en-
crypted VoIP flows of interest by minimally modifying the
departure time of selected packets. This technique trans-
parently compromises the identity of the conversing parties.
However, the authors rely on the strong assumption that one
has access to the customer’s communication device, so that
the watermark can be inserted before the streams of interest
reach the Internet.
This work studies the feasibility of revealing pairs of
anonymous conversing parties (caller/callee pair of streams)
by exploiting the vulnerabilities inherent in VoIP systems.
Using the methods provided in this work, we also note one
seemingly surprising result; that the proposed techniques
are applicable even when the voice packets are encrypted.
While the focus of this work is on VoIP data, the tech-
niques presented here are of independent interest and can
be used for pairing/clustering any type of binary streaming
data. The contributions of the paper function on different
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Figure 1: Overview of the proposed methodology
levels:
1. We formulate the problem of pairing anonymous and
encrypted VoIP calls.
2. We present an elegant and fast solution for the con-
versation pairing problem, which exploits well estab-
lished notions of complementary speech patterns in
conversational dynamics.
3. Our solution is based on an efficient transformation of
the voice streams into binary sequences, followed by a
progressive clustering procedure.
4. Finally, we verify the accuracy of the proposed solu-
tion on the very large dataset of voice conversations.
The paper is organized as follows. Sections 2 - 5 present
our solution for pairing conversations over any medium
by mapping the problem into a complementary clustering
problem for binary streaming data. We introduce various
intuitive metrics to gauge the correlation between two bi-
nary voice streams and we present effective methods for
progressively pairing conversing parties with high accuracy
within a limited amount of time. Section 6 shows how the
presented solution can be adapted for a VoIP framework,
and demonstrates that encryption schemes do not hinder the
applicability of our approach. Section 7 validates the pre-
sented algorithm by experiments on a very large standard
corpus of conversational speech [8]. Finally, we provide
our concluding remarks in Section 8 and we also instigate
directions for future work.
2 Problem Overview and Methodology
We start with a generic description of the conversation
pairing problem, with the intention of highlighting the key
insights governing our solution. We will later clarify the
required changes so as the following model can be adapted
for the VoIP scenario.
2.1 Pairing Voice Conversations
Let us assume that we are monitoring a set S =
{S1, S2, . . . , Sk} of k voice streams (for now suppose k
is even), comprising a total of k/2 conversations1. Each
1In this paper we will not deal with multi-way conversations.
stream holds one-way of a two-way voice conversation, and
there exists also a homologue voice stream that holds the
other side of the conversation. Our objective is to efficiently
reveal the relationship of two-way conversing parties. For
example, assume S2 is actually involved in a conversation
with S5. We aim at finding all relationships Si ↔ Sj in-
cluding the example S2 ↔ S5, such that streams Si and
Sj correspond to each one-way voice stream of the same
conversation. Our approach does not require an even num-
ber of voice streams and we also do not assume each voice
stream to have a matching pair. Any voice stream without
a corresponding counterpart is referenced to henceforth as
a singleton stream. At the end of the pairing process some
streams may remain unmatched. These will be the voice
streams for which the algorithm either does not have ad-
equate data to identify a match, or is not in a position to
discriminate with high confidence a conversational pair.
The key intuition behind our approach is that convers-
ing parties tend to follow a “complementary” speech pat-
tern. When one speaks, the other listens. This “turn-taking”
of conversation [13] represents a basic rule of communica-
tion, well-established in the fields of psycholinguistics, dis-
course analysis and conversation analysis, and it also mani-
fests under the term of speech “coordination” [4]. Needless
to say, one does not expect a conversation to follow strictly
the aforementioned rule. A conversational speech may well
include portions where both contributers speak or are silent.
Such situations are indeed expected, but in practice they do
not significantly “pollute” the results, since given conver-
sations of adequate length, coordinated speech patterns are
bound to dominate. We will show this more explicitly in
the experimental section, where the robustness of the pro-
posed measures are tested also under conditions of network
latency.
Using the above intuitions, we will follow the subsequent
steps for recognizing pairs of conversations:
1. First, voice streams are converted into binary streams,
indicating the presence of voice (1) and silence (0).
2. Second, we leverage the power of complementary sim-
ilarity measures, for quantifying the degree of coordi-
nation between pairs of streams.
3. Using the derived complementary similarity, we will
employ a progressive clustering approach for deducing
conversational pairs.
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A schematic of the above steps is given in Figure 1. In
the following section we will first place our approach within
the context of related work.
2.2 Related Work
Recent work that studies certain VoIP vulnerabilities and
has attracted a lot of media attention has appeared in [14].
The authors present techniques for watermarking VoIP traf-
fic, with the purpose of tracking the marked VoIP packets.
For accomplishing that, however, initial access to a user’s
device or computer is required. In this work we achieve
a different goal; that of identifying conversational pairs,
however we do not assume any access to a user’s device.
The only requirement of our approach (more explanations
will be provided later) is the provision of a limited number
of network sniffers, which will capture the incoming (en-
crypted) VoIP traffic.
Relevant to our approach are also recent techniques for
clustering binary streams [11, 10]. These consider clus-
ters of objects and not pairs of streams, which is one of
the core requirements for the application that we examine.
The algorithm presented in this work has the additional ad-
vantage of being progressive in nature, returning identified
pairs of streams before the complete execution of the al-
gorithm. In [6], Cormode et al., study the use of binary
similarity measures for comparison streams, and focus on
sketch approximations of the Hamming Norm. This work
examines the use of complementary binary similarity mea-
sures between streaming data.
The methods presented in this work, exploit and adapt
data-mining techniques for depicting inherent vulnerabili-
ties in VoIP streams, which can potentially compromise the
users’ anonymity. It is interesting to note, that much of re-
cent work in data-mining [9, 5] has focused on how to em-
bed or maintain privacy for various data-mining techniques,
such as clustering, classification, and so on.
In the sections that follow we will provide a concise de-
scription of a Voice Activity Detector. We will also present
intuitive coordination measures for quantifying the comple-
mentary similarity between binary streams. We put forward
a lightweight pairing technique based on adaptive soft deci-
sions for reduce the pairing errors and avoiding the pairing
of singleton streams. Key requirements include lightweight
processing, quick and accurate identification of the relation-
ships, and resilience to both noise and latency.
3 Voice Activity Detection
The goal of a Voice Activity Detection (VAD) algorithm
is to discriminate between voiced versus unvoiced sections
of a speech stream. We provide only a high-level descrip-
tion of a typical VAD algorithm for reasons of complete-
ness, since it is not the focus of the current work. The
VAD process computes the energy of small overlapping
speech packets (also called frames, with each frame be-
ing 20-30msec in length), and employs an adaptive energy
threshold that will differentiate the voiced from the un-
voiced frames. The threshold is typically deduced by esti-
mating the average energy of the unvoiced portions, taking
also into consideration a background noise model, based on
the characteristics of the data channel. The output of the
VAD algorithm will be “1” when there is speech detected
and “0” in the presence of silence. A simple schematic of
its operation is provided in Fig. 2.
Silence Speech Silence Speech Silence 
0 
1 
Input 
Output 
Figure 2: A Voice Activity Detector can effectively recognize the
portions of silence or speech on a voice stream.
As will be explained later, the voice activity detection is
inherently provided by the VoIP protocol.
4 Coordination Measures
After voice activity detection is performed, each voice
stream Si is converted into a binary stream Bi. The result-
ing binary stream only holds the necessary information that
indicates the speech/no-speech patterns. The objective now
is to quantify the complementary similarity (which we call
cimilarity) between two binary streams.
As already mentioned, the basic insight behind detect-
ing conversational pairs is to discern voice streams that ex-
hibit complementary speech behavior. That is, given a large
number of binary streams B1, B2, . . . , BN , and a query
stream Bq (which indicates the voice activity of user q), we
would like to identify the stream Bj that is most comple-
mentary similar to stream Bq, or in other words, has the
largest cimilarity.
We present different versions of cimilarity measures
(Cim) and we later quantify their performance in the ex-
perimental section. Let us consider two binary streams, Bi
and Bj . By abstracting Bi and Bj as binary sets, an intu-
itive measure of coordination between users i and j consists
in computing the intersection between Bi and the binary
complement of Bj normalized by their union. We denote
by Cim-asym(i, j, T ) this measure computed over streams
Bi and Bj after T units of time. One can readily verify that
it can be written as:
Cim-asym(i, j, T ) =
∑T
t=1 Bi[t] ∧ ¬Bj [t]∑T
t=1 Bi[t] ∨ ¬Bj [t]
. (1)
where Bk(t) ∈ {0, 1} is the binary value for user k at time
t, and the symbols ∧, ∨, and ¬ denote the binary AND, OR
and NOT operators, respectively.
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Note that Equation 1 asymmetrically measures the
amount of coordination between speakers i and j. That
is, in general, Cim-asym(i, j, T ) = Cim-asym(j, i, T ) due
to the binary complement operator. This measure can be
seen as the asymmetric extension of the well-known Jac-
card coefficient [3]. Thus, we also refer to this measure as
Jaccard-Asymmetric.
Bi \ Bj 1 0
1 0 1
0 0 0
Bi \ Bj 1 0
1 1 1
0 0 1
Figure 3: Computation of Cim-asym, Left: Numerator, Right:
Denominator
Computing Cim-asym between two binary streams is
computationally very light. The computation lookup ta-
ble for the numerator and the denominator is provided in
Figure 3. The numerator is increased when Bi = 1 and
Bj = 0, while the denominator is not increased when
Bi = 0 and Bj = 1. So Cim-asym(Bi, Bj) only rewards
the presence of non-speech of user j, when user i speaks.
Example: Given B1 = 11100110 and B2 = 00010001
then cim-asym(B1, B2) = 0.833 and cim-asym(B2, B1) =
0.6667.
The Cim-asym measure is also easily amenable to in-
cremental maintenance as time T progresses. Indeed, let
V∧(i, j) and V∨(i, j) denote the running values of the nu-
merator and the denominator, respectively. The value of
Cim-asym(i, j, T ) for any elapsed time T is given by the ra-
tio V∧(i, j)/V∨(i, j). Therefore, given n binary streams, in-
crementally computing Cim-asym requires keeping 2 times
n(n− 1) values in memory. For example, when monitoring
n = 1000 streams and assuming each value is stored as an
int16, only 4 MBytes of memory are needed for tracking all
the required statistics.
We also consider a symmetric extension of Cim-asym de-
noted by Cim-sym and referred to as Jaccard-Symmetric.
This intuitive extension is written as:
Cim-sym(i, j, T ) =
T∑
t=1
(Bi[t] ∧ ¬Bj [t]) ∨ (¬Bi[t] ∧Bj [t]))
T
=
T∑
t=1
XOR(Bi[t], Bj [t])
T
,
(2)
This metric is even simpler than its asymmetric ver-
sion. Moreover, given n binary streams, incrementally
computing Cim-sym requires keeping only
(
n
2
)
values in
memory thanks to its symmetric nature. Using the exam-
ple above, memory requirements drop to approximately 1
Mbytes given the same assumptions. The Cim-sym is gen-
erally more aggressive than its asymmetric counterpart, be-
cause it also rewards the presence of speech patterns when
the user in question does not speak. However, our experi-
ments indicate that the most conservative asymmetric ver-
sion ultimately achieves the best detection accuracy.
Finally we consider the Mutual Information (MI) as a
measure of coordination between conversing parties [1].
This is a measure of how much information can be obtained
about one random variable Bi by observing another Bj . Let
pi,j(x, y), pi(x), and pj(y) with x, y ∈ 0, 1 denote the joint
and marginal running averages for users i and j after T units
of time. For example,
pi,j(0, 1) =
1
T
T∑
t=1
¬Bi[t] ∧Bj [t].
The amount of Mutual Information (MI) between streams
Bi and Bj is written as:
MI =
∑
x,y∈0,1
pi,j(x, y) log2
pi,j(x, y)
pi(x)pj(y) (3)
The mutual information measure requires higher
processing power but exhibits symmetry. Note that while
at first it seems that one needs to store 8 statistics for up-
dating the Mutual Information, in fact only 3 statistics are
required. For example pi,j(0, 0), pi,j(0, 1) and pi,j(1, 0)
are sufficient to restore the remaining ones, since:
pi,j(1, 1) = 1− pi,j(0, 0)− pi,j(0, 1)− pi,j(1, 0)
pi(0) = pi,j(0, 0) + pi,j(0, 1)
pj(0) = pi,j(0, 0) + pi,j(1, 0)
and so on.
So, given n binary streams, it can be shown that incre-
mentally computing MI requires keeping 3 times
(
n
2
)
values
in memory thanks to its symmetric nature. Thus, approx-
imately 3 MBytes of memory are required for the above
example.
In the following section, we illustrate how any of the
above metrics can be used in conjunction with a progres-
sive clustering algorithm for identifying conversing pairs.
5 Conversation Pairing/Clustering
In order to get insights about the pairing algorithm we
first plot how the complementary similarity of one voice
stream progresses over time against all other streams (Fig-
ure 4). Similar behavior is observed for the majority of
voice streams.
One can notice that voice pairing is extremely ambiva-
lent during the initial stages of a conversation, but the un-
certainty decreases as conversations progress. This is ob-
served, first, because most conversations in the beginning
4
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Figure 4: Progression of complementary similarity (Jaccard-
Asymmetric) over time for stream 1, against all other voice
streams. The true match has the highest value after time t.
exhibit a customary dialog pattern (“hi,” “how are you,”
etc.). However, conversations are bound to evolve in differ-
ent conversational patterns, leading to a progressive decay
in the matching ambiguity. Second, some time is required to
elapse, so as the Law of Large Numbers can come to effect.
A simple solution for tackling the conversation pairing
problem would be to compute the pairwise similarity ma-
trix M after some time T , where each entry provides the
complementary similarity between two streams:
M(i, j) = Cim(i, j, T ),
where Cim is one of the cimilarity measures that we pre-
sented in Section 4.
Then we can pair users i and j if we have
M(i, j) = max

{M(i, )}
and
M(i, j) = max

{M(, j)}.
We call this approach hard clustering, because at each
time instance it provides a rigid assignment of pairs, without
providing any hints about the confidence or ambiguity of the
matching.
There are several shortcomings that can be identified
with the above hard clustering approach:
• First, it provides no concrete indication when the pair-
ing should start. When are the sufficient statistics ro-
bust enough to indicate that pairing should commence?
• In order to achieve high accuracy, sufficient data need
to be collected. This penalizes the system responsive-
ness (no decision is made until then) and additionally
significant resources are wasted (memory and CPU).
• Different streams will converge at different rates to
their expected similarity value. Therefore, decisions
for different pairs of streams can (or cannot) be made
at different times, which is not exploited by the hard
clustering approach.
In the stream-pairing algorithm that we describe below,
we will address all the previous issues, allowing the early
pairing of streams, while imposing minimal impact on the
system resources.
Using as a guide the aforementioned behavior which
governs the progression of cimilarity, we construct the clus-
tering algorithm as an outlier detection scheme. What we
have to examine is whether the closest match is “sufficiently
distant” from the majority of streams. Therefore, when
comparing a stream (e.g. stream 1) against all others, the
most likely matching candidate should not only hold the
maximum cimilarity, but also deviate sufficiently from the
cimilarity of the remaining streams.
1. Function matchStreams(S, f )
2. /* S contains all the streams [1 : N ] */
3. for (t = 0, 1, 2, . . . , T )
4. /* T is an upper bound that will depend on n (Ideally,
T = Θ(lnn)) */
5. Update the pairwise similarity matrix M(·, ·)
6. foreach unmatched stream si
7. compute max1, max2 of M(si, ·)
8. smi ← stream ID of max1
9. trimmedMsi ← k-trim of M(si, ·)
10. cMass ← mean of trimmedMsi
11. if (max1 −max2 > f · (max2 − cMass))
12. /* stream si matches with stream smi */
13. remove rows si, smi from M
14. remove columns si, smi from M
15. if (all streams are paired) return
Figure 5: Progressive algorithm for matching streams.
Figure 5 contains a pseudocode of the pairing algorithm,
while Figure 6 depicts the steps behind its execution. We
maintain the same matrix M as in the hard-clustering ap-
proach, which is updated as time progresses. Then, at every
step of the algorithm, for every stream that has not been
matched, we perform the following actions. Suppose that at
any time T we start with the binary stream B1:
1. We perform a k-Trim for removing the k most distant
and k closest matches (typically k = 2 . . . 5).
2. We compute the average cMass (center of mass) of the
remaining stream cimilarities.
3. We record the cimilarity of the two closest matches
to stream B1, which we denote as max1 and max2.
We consider the closest match “sufficiently separated”
from the remaining streams if the following holds:
max1 − max2 > f · (max2 − cMass),
where the f constant captures the assurance (confi-
dence) about the quality of our match (values of f
range within 0.5 . . . 2). Greater values of f , signify
more separable best match compared to the remaining
streams, and hence more confident matching.
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Figure 6: Pairing of voice conversations.
4. If the above criterion does not hold we cannot make
a decision about stream B1, otherwise we match B1
with Bmax1 and we remove their corresponding rows
and columns from the pairwise cimilarity matrix (Fig-
ure 7)
Notice that the outlier detection criterion adapts accord-
ing to the current similarity distribution, being more strict
in the initial phases (wider (max2 − cMass)) and becoming
more flexible as time passes.
Furthermore, the algorithm does not need to know a pri-
ori a bound on the required time steps for execution. As
soon as there is sufficient information, it makes use of it and
it identifies the likely pairs. In the next section we analyze
the performance of the algorithm.
5.1 Time and Space Complexity
Compared to the hard-clustering approach that needs to
recompute the pairwise similarity matrix M for every time
step, the progressive algorithm reduces the computational
cost by progressively removing from the distance computa-
tion the streams that have already been paired, although the
initial stages of the algorithm are somehow more expensive,
since in every iteration there are more operations performed
than just the update of the similarity matrix M .
So, let us analyze the time and space that our algorithm
requires. Initially there are n streams, so the size of ma-
trix M is n2, hence the space requirement is O(n2).
For the time complexity, assume that at time step t there
are St streams available. Then the running time required
to execute the tth step is O(S2t ). To see that, notice that
line 5, where we update the cimilarity matrix M , requires
O(S2t ) time steps. The foreach loop at line 6, where we
process each stream, is executed at most St times and each
of the commands inside the loop can be computed in linear
(in St) time. (The most involved is line 9 for computing the
k-trim, which can be done with a variation of a linear al-
gorithm for computing the median.) Therefore, the running
time of every time step of the algorithm is O(S2t ), in other
words there exists a constant κ such that the time per step is
bounded by κ · S2t .
Therefore, if Tr is the total running time, we have
Tr ≤ κ ·
∞∑
t=1
S2t ,
where κ is the constant hidden in the asymptotic notation.
It is therefore clear that in order to analyze the running time
we have to evaluate how the values St decrease, and in par-
ticular when St becomes 0. Our experimental results, de-
picted in Figure 15, indicate that a candidate function for St
is given by the sigmoidal function
St = n · e
− t−c1 lnnc2
1 + e−
t−c1 lnn
c2
,
for some constants c1 and c2, which in our case we esti-
mated as 15 and 20, respectively. In Figure 8 we show the
sigmoidal function that matches the observed data.
Having this in mind, we can estimate
∞∑
t=1
S2t =
∞∑
t=1
n2 · e
− 2(t−lnn)c2(
1 + e−
t−c1 lnn
c2
)2
=
c1 lnn∑
t=1
n2 · e
− 2(t−lnn)c2(
1 + e−
t−c1 lnn
c2
)2
+
∞∑
t=c1 lnn+1
n2 · e
− 2(t−lnn)c2(
1 + e−
t−c1 lnn
c2
)2
≤ c1 · n2 lnn+O(n2),
and, therefore, Tr ≤ c1 · κ · n2 lnn + O(n2). Notice that
we can obtain a similar bound (with worse constants) by
noticing (after some calculations) that after time t = (c1 +
c2) lnn we have St < 1, so we can bound the running time
by (c1 + c2)κ · n2 lnn.
Therefore, the algorithm is efficient, since it only intro-
duces an O(n log n) complexity per data stream by pro-
gressively removing paired matches. In Figure 9 we depict
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Figure 7: The similarity/dissimilarity matrix does not have to be
completed fully, for all time instances. Matching pairs can be re-
moved from computation.
the lifecycle of various streams for an experiment with 280
voice streams. Each line represents a voice stream and is
extended only up to the point that the stream is paired.
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Figure 8: A sigmoidal function that models the results in Fig-
ure 15.
Note that this analysis is based on our observed data.
A more rigorous approach can consider some underly-
ing probability space to model the streams generations.
Then Tr and St are random variables and we can study
quantities such as the expected running time and variance,
or give large-deviation bounds. For example, for the ex-
pected running time of the algorithm, we have
E[Tr] ≤ E
[
κ ·
∞∑
t=1
S2t
]
= κ ·
∞∑
t=1
E
[
S2t
]
,
since the St’s are nonnegative. This gives the interesting
conclusion that the expected running time depends on the
variance of the number of streams that remain unpaired
throughout the execution of the algorithm.
6 Extending to a VoIP network
We explain how the previous model of pairing voice con-
versations can be extended to work on a voice-over-IP net-
work. In what follows we describe the structure and trans-
mission protocol of a typical VoIP network and we illustrate
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Figure 9: We show the number of remaining streams at each time
instance on an experiment with 280 streams. The darker stream
indicates the actual best match which is identified after 240 sec-
onds.
the steps for reconstructing the binary voice activity stream
from a sequence of VoIP packets.
We consider the framework depicted in Figure 10. N
VoIP subscribers are connected to the Internet either di-
rectly via their ISP providers, or behind VoIP gateways on
traditional PSTN networks. Those VoIP subscribers may
use a low-latency anonymizing service composed of a set of
overlay network nodes. Each VoIP stream traverses a possi-
bly distinct set of IP routers, a subset of which are assumed
to have VoIP sniffing capabilities. Each sniffer preprocesses
the incoming VoIP traffic and forwards the resulting data to
a central processing unit.
PSTN
PSTN
VoIP
gateway
VoIP
gateway
IP Network
ISP
ISP
 
	


Figure 10: VoIP Framework. A set of customers (triangles) with
direct access to the IP network or behind a PSTN network. A set
of IP routers (white circles), a subset of which are VoIP sniffers
(black circles) that forward preprocessed VoIP data to a Central
Processing Unit. An anonymizing network composed of a set of
overlay nodes (light-shaded squares).
A voice signal captured by a communication device goes
through a series of steps in preparation for streaming. Fig-
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ure 11 summarizes some of the following concepts. A voice
signal is continually captured by the microphone of a com-
munication device. The digital signal is segmented and fed
to a Voice Activity Detection (VAD) unit. This feature al-
lows VoIP devices to detect whether the user is currently
speaking or not by analyzing voice activity. Whenever the
voice activity is below a certain adaptive threshold, the cur-
rent segment is dropped. Note that if the VAD algorithm is
not sophisticated enough, actual voiced segments may get
wrongly filtered out [12]. The filtered signal is then passed
through a voice codec unit (e.g., G.729.1 or GSM) that com-
presses the input voice segments to an average bit rate of
approximately 10 Kbps. Those compressed segments are
encrypted using 256-bit AES [2] and packetized using the
Real-time Transport Protocol (RTP). Each RTP packet con-
sists of a 12-byte header followed by 20ms worth of en-
crypted and compressed voice. It is important to note that
all RTP headers are in the clear [2]. Various RTP header
fields are of great interest for our purpose. In particular,
the Payload Type (PT) field enables easy spotting of VoIP
streams, the Synchronization Source (SSRC) field uniquely
identifies the stream of packets, and the Timestamp field
reflects the sampling instant of the first byte in the RTP
payload. Finally, each RTP packet is written to a network
socket.
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Figure 11: A voice signal captured by a communication device
goes through various steps in preparation for streaming.
6.1 Separating the voice streams
For recasting the problem into the scenario that we previ-
ously studied, we need first to reconstruct the binary streams
indicating the voice activity of each one-way communica-
tion. Given the above transmission protocol a VoIP sniffer
that gathers incoming internet traffic can identify and sepa-
rate the different voice streams and also convert them into
binary streams that indicate periods of activity or silence as
follows:
1. The RTP PT field is used to segregate VoIP packets
from different data traffic (see Figure 12)
2. Each different voice stream can be tracked by its
unique RTP SSRC field.
Payload Type SSRC TimeStamp
RTP protocol
Compressed and encrypted voice data… …Sequence Number
Recognize VoIP data
Recognize Stream
Position into Stream
Figure 12: Fields of the RTP protocol that are used
3. Finally, the binary stream indicating the presence of
speech or silence, is inherently provided by the VoIP
protocol, given the presence or not of a voice packet.
Packets are only sent during speech activity which con-
stitutes an indirect way of constructing the binary voice
activity stream. For a given RTP SSRC value (stream
ID), a sniffer measures the difference of two consec-
utive Timestamp values (inter-departure time of pack-
ets) and generates a one (or a zero) if the difference
is equal to (or larger than) the segmentation interval
of 20ms. Thus, each binary stream results from the
aperiodic inter-departure time of VoIP packets derived
from the Voice Activity Detection (VAD), which is
performed within the customer’s communication de-
vice. In Figure 13 we visualize this process.
wall-clock 
time
20 m
sec
100 m
sec
120 m
sec
200 m
sec
220 m
sec
240 m
sec
After 20msec
After 120msec
After 140msec
After 200msec
After 260msec
After 280msec
Packet
RTP timestamp
packets
Figure 13: Usage of RTP Timestamp for reconstructing the binary
voice activity sequence
6.2 Advantages and Discussions
Several are the advantages of the presented approach:
• A very important first outcome of the presented ap-
proach is that it operates on the compressed data do-
main. Because we do not need to decompress the voice
data to perform any action, this immediately gives a
significant performance advantage to our approach.
• A surprising second observation, is that the presented
methodology is also valid even when the voice data is
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encrypted! This is true because for performing voice
activity detection we merely exploit the presence of the
packet as an indication of speech. Note, that because
the data can still be encrypted, the privacy of the con-
versation content is not violated.
• Finally, the presented algorithm is very robust to jitter
and network latency. Jitter has no effect on the RTP
Timestamp values, which are assigned during the data
transmission and measure the inter-departure packet
time. Network latency only affects the arrival of the
first packet, since synchronization of subsequent pack-
ets can be reconstructed by the corresponding RTP
timestamps. In our experiments we do not assume
a zero-latency network. Instead we show that our
method is indeed resilient to latency.
Lastly, we briefly elaborate on certain issues or questions
that may arise given the dynamic nature of the system:
a) We do not assume that the network sniffers are able to
track all voice streams. Singleton streams can be present.
This does not pose a problem for our algorithm since we do
not enforce pairing of all streams.
b) The cardinality of voice conversations captured by the
sniffer changes over time as calls start and/or terminate.
Therefore, one should pair streams that commence at ap-
proximately the same time (within twice the assumed worse
network latency). This gives rise to multiple cimilarity ar-
rays formed by voice streams with similar arrival times. In
the experiments we do not consider this scenario, but we
experiment with k voice streams that begin simultaneously
for illustrating better the scalability and accuracy of our ap-
proach under the maximum possible load.
c) Finally, it is worth noting that the RTP Sequence Num-
ber field together with the Timestamp values help avoid
blindly concluding a packet has been filtered out by the
VAD unit while, in fact, it has been dropped by the network.
However losses are seldom in commercial VoIP networks
and in this work we do assume a lossless VoIP framework.
7 Experiments
As our experimental testbed we used real telephony con-
versations from switchboard data [8], which contained 500
pairs of conversations for a total of 1000 voice streams and
consisted of multiple pairs of users conversing on diverse
topics. Such datasets are typically used in many speech
recognition contests for quantifying the quality of differ-
ent speech-to-text processes. The specific dataset that we
used, consisted actually of quite noisy conversational data
and the length of each conversation is 300 sec. The original
voice data have been converted to VoIP packets (using the
protocol described in the VoIP section), then fed onto a lo-
cal network using our custom made workload generator and
recaptured by the data sniffers.
7.1 Comparison of Cimilarity Measures
In this initial experiment we compare the pairing accu-
racy of the three presented complementary similarity mea-
sures. We utilize the hard clustering approach which does
not leave any unassigned pairs, therefore it introduces a
larger amount of incorrectly classified pairs. However, since
the hard clustering follows a more aggressive pairing strat-
egy, this experiment essentially showcases the best possible
convergence rate of the various similarity measures.
Figure 14 presents the pairing accuracy of the Mutual In-
formation (MI), Jaccard Asymmetric and Jaccard Symmet-
ric measures. Every 10 seconds we calculate the recogni-
tion accuracy by pairing each of the voice streams with the
stream that depicts the maximum complementary similarity.
Notice than in this way we do not necessarily impose a 1-
to-1 mapping of the streams (hence, a stream may be paired
with more than one streams). We report the results using
the 1-to-n mapping, since we discovered that it consistently
achieves more accurate results than the 1-to-1 mapping.
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Figure 14: Pairing accuracy between 3 measures.
On the figure we can observe that the Asymmetric-
Jaccard measure is the best overall performer. It achieves
faster convergence rate than the Mutual Information (90%
accuracy after 120sec, instead of 150sec for the MI) and
also a larger amount of correctly classified pairs at the end
of the experiment. The Symmetric-Jaccard measure appears
to be quite aggressive in its pairing decisions in the be-
ginning, but flattens out fairly quickly, therefore it cannot
compete in terms of accuracy with the other two measures.
Since different measures appear to exhibit diverse conver-
gence rates, as possible future work it would be interesting
to explore the possibility of alternating use for the various
measures at different stages of the execution, in order to
achieve even faster pairing decisions.
In general, the results of this first experiment are very en-
couraging, since they indicate that the use of simple match-
ing measures (like the Asymmetric Jaccard) can achieve
comparable or better pairing accuracy than more complex
measures (such as the Mutual Information). For the remain-
der of the experiments we will focus on the Asymmetric-
Jaccard measure, and specifically on its performance using
the progressive pairing algorithm.
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Figure 15: Progressive pairing for Asymmetric Jaccard. Left: f = 1/2, Middle: f = 2/3, Right: f = 1
7.2 Progressive Clustering Accuracy
The progressive algorithm presented in the paper has two
distinct advantages over the hard clustering approach:
1. It avoids the continuous pairwise distance computa-
tion by leveraging the progressive removal of already
paired streams.
2. It eliminates almost completely the incorrect stream
pairings.
The second goal is achieved by reducing the aggressive-
ness of the pairing protocol, which in practice will have
a small impact on the convergence rate (compared to the
hard clustering approach). Recall that the progressive al-
gorithm classifies the stream with the maximum cimilarity
value (max1) as a match, if
max1 − max2 > f · (max2 − cMass).
The value f essentially tunes the algorithm’s conver-
gence rate. Smaller values of f mean that the algorithm is
more elastic in its pairing decisions, hence achieving faster
convergence, but possibly introducing a larger amount of in-
correctly classified pairs. By imposing larger f values, we
restrict the algorithm in taking more conservative decisions.
This way fewer mistakes are made, at the expense of more
prolonged convergence times.
In Figure 15 we present the accuracy of the Asymmetric-
Jaccard using values of f = 1/2, 2/3, 1. The darker part
of the graph indicates the correctly classified pairs, the
medium gray the incorrect pairing, and the white part are
the remaining streams for which no decision has yet been
made. From the graph, one can observe that for the ex-
amined dataset f = 2/3 represents the best compromise
between convergence rate and false pairing rate. The final
pairing results after 300sec are: correctly paired = 972,
incorrectly paired = 6, undecided = 24. Contrasting
this with the hard clustering results at 300sec (correctly
paired = 982, incorrectly paired = 18), we see that we can
achieve fewer false assignments, while being quite competi-
tive on the correct assignments and at the same time accom-
plishing a progressive clustering that is computationally less
demanding.
7.3 Resilience to Latency
We conduct experiments which indicate that the match-
ing quality is not compromised by potential end-to-end net-
work delay. For simplicity of exposition we assume an end-
to-end delay for each stream that remains constant as time
passes (even though on a real network delay will vary over
time).
For this experiment we assume that each stream expe-
riences a different global latency, drawn randomly from a
uniform distribution within the range [0, 2δ], where δ is the
observed one-way network latency. We conduct 4 sets of
experiments with values δ = 40, 80, 160, 240msec, there-
fore the maximum possible synchronization gap between 2
pairing streams can be up to 2δ.
Figure 16 displays the pairing accuracy using the two
clustering parameters that produce the least amount of mis-
classifications, f = 2/3 and f = 1. The 3D areas indi-
cate the number of correctly paired streams, while on top
of the surface we also indicate in parenthesis the number
of incorrect pairings. We report the exact arithmetic val-
ues for the mid-point of the experiment (150sec) and at the
end of the experiment (300sec). Generally, we observe that
the clustering approach is robust even for large end-to-end
latency. The accuracy of the pairing technique is not com-
promised, since the number of misclassified pairs does not
increase. For latency of 40–80msec the correctly classified
pairs still remain approximately around 970/1000. This
number drops slightly to 960/1000 for 240msec of latency,
but still the number of misclassified pairs does not change.
Therefore, latency affects primarily the convergence rate,
since ambiguity is increased, however accuracy is not com-
promised.
One can explain these results by noting that comple-
mentary similarity is most dominantly affected by the long
speech and silence segments (and not by the very short
ones). The long speech and non-speech patterns between
conversing users are not radically misaligned by typical net-
work end-to-end latencies, therefore the stream similarities
in practice do not deviate significantly from their expected
values.
Summarizing the experiments, we have shown that the
progressive algorithm can achieve pairing accuracy that
reaches 96–97%, while it can be tuned for faster conver-
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Figure 16: Accuracy of progressive pairing under conditions of end-to-end network delay. The graph depicts the correctly paired streams,
while in the parenthesis we provide the number of incorrectly paired ones. Left: f = 2/3, Right: f = 1
gence or minimization of false classifications. More sig-
nificantly, we have demonstrated that the clustering perfor-
mance is not affected by the network latency, since latency
does not significantly affect the dominant temporal dynam-
ics between conversational patterns.
8 Conclusions
We have presented results indicating that intercepted
VoIP data can potentially reveal private information such
as pairs of conversing parties. Careful analysis of the voice
packets coupled with an effective complementary pairing
of voice activities can achieve high accuracy rates. We
have also demonstrated that data encryption schemes can-
not throttle the pairing of conversations. While we have
attempted to examine the current problem from multiple as-
pects, many avenues are still open for investigation. Areas
that that we are currently exploring are the provision for
distributed execution of our pairing algorithm, as well as
the fusion of multiple distance measures at different execu-
tion stages of the algorithm. The ultimate objective of such
efforts are to provide a pairing algorithm that exhibits fast
convergence, in addition to being robust and accurate. We
believe that our algorithms and pairing models could be of
independent interest, for general pairing of binary streaming
data. Closing, we would like to point out that the main ob-
jective of this paper was not to suggest ways of intercepting
VoIP traffic for malicious reasons, but merely to raise the
awareness that privacy on Internet telephony can be easily
compromised.
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